Iran, June 05: The Gulf–Iran relations have long been plagued with several complications and contradictions. Even before the Islamic Revolution, Iranian ambitions were plain to see from the time the Shah declared Bahrain as part of the Iranian state till it occupied the three UAE islands in 1971. When the revolution broke out in 1979, Gulf countries grew apprehensive of the spread of revolutionary ideology in the Gulf region, especially in countries having a large Shiite population. The Iran–Iraq war revealed the position of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries towards Iran, when they supported Baghdad in that war, which lasted eight years. This political alignment led to a huge disappointment when Saddam Hussein occupied Kuwait leading to severe political, military and strategic consequences emanating from this misguided step.
However, this new orientation did not last long as the terms of the two Presidents—Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammed Khatami—when Gulf–Iran relations took a balanced and open direction that culminated in a security agreement in 2001 that represented an important point for the two sides. This progress went awry with the arrival of Ahmadinejad as the president and the return of the idea of exporting Iranian hegemony, if not the revolution.
Recently, Iranian officials issued many statements after UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan asserted the UAE’s right to reclaim the islands and made logical and coherent comparisons between occupations. It is indeed amazing to note the level of bluster and arrogance issuing from Tehran that went to the extent of threatening the “wrath of the Iranian people,” as if societies were still run by law of the jungle. This proves that Tehran’s refrain of Islamic brotherhood, good neighborliness and the “common enemy” (Israel) is merely sloganeering. In fact, it is an attempt to hide Iran’s secret intentions, which it often blatantly exposes in the worst form.
Iran–Gulf relations further worsened after the Islamic Republic announced the resumption of its nuclear programs, which Gulf countries see as a direct threat to its security and oil installations, and as a pointer to growing Iranian influence in the region that could lead to a major imbalance in power. What do Gulf countries fear from a nuclear Iran?
First, we find an upsurge in Shiite influence. There is growing concern among Arab leaders over Iran’s influence and its effects on Shiite minorities in Gulf countries—like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. These minorities live in complete harmony in their countries but foreign interference and instigation could fuel disturbance and instability. In the recent past, we witnessed the removal of a Bahraini minister of state, Mansour bin Rajab, in wake of charges of money laundering for Iranian Revolutionary Guard as a means to foil sanctions imposed on it. Although details of the investigations have not been revealed, the issue ranges from money laundering to the sale of banned Iranian drugs to countries like Azerbaijan and Columbia, and to other less serious concerns that are linked to influential parties in Tehran.
In Kuwait, security agencies have arrested a network of spies that worked for Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The mission of these spies was to keep tabs on Kuwait’s vital military facilities and locations of US forces in the country, in addition to sending reports on the political situation in Kuwait. Although Kuwaiti public prosecution issued a circular against the publication of the incident because it is sub-judice, the real concern was that national unity could be affected. The concern was legitimate as some Shiite media sources—sympathetic to Tehran—launched a counter attack by calling the news on the busting of the network as mere hearsay that was aimed at sectarian instigation and was in the interest of Israel.
It is certain that when Iran gets a nuclear bomb it would further embolden these elements and increase the influence of Iran, if it continues with its current behavior. This attitude is deepening the contradictions in society and making a sizeable portion of Gulf citizenry believe that Iran is their protector and that it is capable of supporting them by participating in politics, economy and decision-making.
Second, we are confronted with Iranian hegemony over the region. With its nuclear program, Iran could be encouraged to follow a more hard-line and active foreign policy in the region. From observation, it has become evident that the Islamic Republic has gained place in new negotiations in the region—ranging from Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, because of its large presence in the Arab region, through its alliances with Hezbollah and Hamas in Damascus. It has gained this influence at the expense of the role of Gulf countries—especially Saudi Arabia—that always played an influential role in the process of forming Middle East policies.
There is also the likelihood of a military strike. In case a military strike is carried out against Iran, Gulf countries in alliance with the United States would find themselves at the forefront of this conflict because of the presence of military bases on their lands. In addition, there is concern for oil security, which is the main artery for Gulf countries. In this regard, recent exercises by Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the Arab Gulf and Strait of Hormuz deserve to be noticed.
In addition to direct threat of war or sanctions on Iran, the above-mentioned reasons could also lead to a scenario of an escalation in arms race in the Gulf. However, it is not farfetched that a nuclear race ensues, if Iran is able to continue with its nuclear project due to lack of international resolve and its exceptional capabilities in negotiating to the very brink of the abyss. A nuclear race of this kind would drain the potential of Gulf Arab countries and Iran alike. It will impede development in countries, where most of the population is young and in need of jobs. It will pit the region in the face a dangerous sectarian division that would make the mission of the moderate forces impossible and would make the calls for dialogue futile and useless. (ECSSR)
Dr. Bechara Nassar Charbel obtained his PhD from the Faculy of Arab & Islamic Studies at Paris Sorbonne University - Paris IV in 1983. He continued his higher education at the University of Southern California and New York University in the US. While working as a journalist from 1985 to 1987, he also teached at the American University of Beirut.
---Agencies
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