US wants to deny failure in Afghanistan, says report

Afghanistan: Afghanistan has always ended the supremacy superpowers that invaded it, for instance, the Mughals, the British, and the Russians. The United States began its invasion of the country thinking it would be an exception.

Statistics of troop casualties, thorough examinations of failed strategies, and the overall lack of progress to show for its almost two-decade-long military campaign weren’t exactly shared with the American people. Had that happened, America’s failure would have punctured the narrative of Uncle Sam experiencing a different fate.

The Washington Post’s investigations revealed that such truths were hidden so as to conceal US’ failure in Afghanistan.

A report commissioned by a US Congress-formed agency called the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), launched an $11 million project named “Lessons Learned” which shows just how overwhelmed troops were. This initiative consisted of interviews with diplomats, army officials, and others who have experienced the Afghan War to find out what went wrong during the war.

After a three-year-long legal battle to obtain the Washington Post could lay its hands on the SIGAR report. However, the names of 366 others (who are these others) have been blacked out. The identities of only 62 persons were not censored. Through further cross-checking and investigation by the renowned news organization, 33 additional interviewees were identified.

Three American Presidents–George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump–have differed in their approaches to solving the Afghanistan quandary. Yet the extensive content of the SIGAR reports shows that the strategies of all three presidents yielded no success during the lengthy American military presence in the country.

For instance, the Taliban’s ability to resurface again after their ouster by US forces or the fact that American forces didn’t know who their primary enemy were recurring responses throughout interviews. They also deplore the fact that instead of negotiating with the Taliban earlier, America conflated the Taliban with Al-Qaeda when they were two overlapping, yet distinct entities.

Military generals and policymakers alike with little understanding of Afghan society, culture, and its history of quashing any occupier were identified as factors that contributed to this unsuccessful campaign.

With these questions unanswered, the war raged on and the United States couldn’t make a break with a deteriorating security situation. Even an inconclusive victory was out of reach.

Additionally, the regime that the United States kept backing couldn’t shed its corrupt practices with respect to governance and law and order. Such corruption rendered the mainstream Afghan government as ineffective when it came to dispensing justice or providing stability. Hence, the Taliban filled these voids through its violent, extremist methods.

The SIGAR report left no stone unturned in showcasing what went wrong in Afghanistan.