Prime Minister Narendra Modi started on a note of gung-ho on his foreign policy. With no major issue needing to be addressed, he had a free run for far too long. The first major challenge to the Indian foreign policy establishment is the crisis in Iran. Leadership is tested during a crisis, but the Modi government tripped, unable to grapple with the war. With India reduced to irrelevance in the West Asian crisis, the foreign policy failures are coming to haunt him.
The right-wing think-tanks running the foreign policy establishment are hardly equipped to rise to the occasion to deal with a situation of such magnitude. The result is confusion worse confounded.
There was a national consensus on Indian foreign policy all along, which has broken down under Prime Minister Modi. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, as external affairs minister in the Janata Party government of Morarji Desai, made the first contact with Israel by inviting the then Israeli foreign minister Moshe Dayan in 1977.
In a covert visit, Dayan came in disguise and was accommodated at a private residence in Safdarjung Enclave in New Delhi. The Janata Party government feared its imminent collapse if the visit became public.
Similarly, Vajpayee visited China in February 1979, much against the wishes of the Congress, the then principal Opposition party, which cautioned him against undertaking such a visit. China invaded Kampuchea when Vajpayee was still on Chinese soil, forcing him to cut short his visit and hastily return to India.
Now amid fanfare, Prime Minister Modi visited Israel hours before the Tel Aviv-Washington attack on Iran was launched.
Modi’s gimmickry during the Iran war is reminiscent of the similar trick played by Vajpayee during the Iraq war. Both played dalliance with the US — Vajpayee with then US president George W Bush during the Iraq war in 2003, and Modi with US President Donald Trump during the Iran war in 2026. Interestingly, both suffered a serious setback, with their images taking a severe beating.
In 2003, Vajpayee made a commitment to Bush that India would join the United States war in Iraq by sending troops. When it became public, the then leader of Opposition Sonia Gandhi challenged the decision. Indian troops can fight only under the United Nations flag, not under the flag of an individual country, howsoever big or mighty.
Gandhi forced a debate on April 8, 2003, in the Lok Sabha, at the end of which she insisted on the House adopting a resolution condemning the US attack on Iraq. Under compulsion, Vajpayee agreed to a resolution, but soon developed cold feet at the prospect of condemning US aggression on Iraq.
At the last minute, Vajpayee chose to move the resolution in Hindi, not English, to avoid the word “condemn” being directed at the United States. In Hindi, he used the milder term “Ninda,” which merely means deplore and not condemnation.
In 2026, Prime Minister Modi, having made a similar commitment to Trump that India would side with the US-Israel war on Iran, is utterly shocked by the consequences flowing from his own decisions. Like Vajpayee before him, Modi has betrayed a loss of moorings in Indian foreign policy. Abandoning principles, the Modi government is facing flak on several counts.
First, the failure to condemn the brazen assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Whatever the issues involved, the assassination of the Iranian head of state deserved unqualified condemnation. Worse was to follow. It took five days to decide to sign the condolence register at the Iranian Embassy in New Delhi.
In the fitness of things, Modi, or at the very least External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, ought to have visited the embassy in person. At the last minute, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri was sent in their place. Since Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh happened to be in Delhi for the Raisina Dialogue, Jaishankar did meet him – but it was too little, too late.
Second, not condemning the US and Israeli missile attacks on Iran while condemning Iranian retaliatory strikes seemed. On the face of it, it is inexplicable.
Third, not criticising the United States for sinking the Iranian naval ship Dena in the neighbourhood of the Indian Ocean. The Iranian ship had arrived on India’s invitation to take part in the naval exercise Milan, organised in Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh. When the frigate was returning to Iran, US missiles torpedoed it. By any number of international conventions – and by simple moral logic – India was the net security-provider for the safe return of that ship. Yet, there was neither condemnation for its sinking nor for the death of the cadets on board, though Sri Lanka rescued some.
Fourth, Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Israel barely 36 hours before Israel and the United States began pounding Iran with air strikes left a bad taste in the mouth.
Fifth, Modi’s continued kowtowing to US President Trump, despite repeated humiliations, came as a shock. Trump’s treatment of India has been anything but that of an equal partner: steep tariffs were imposed unilaterally; the India-US trade deal that followed was heavily one-sided; India was threatened with action if it was seen straying from the US line; Washington dictated where India should buy its oil from, at one point giving New Delhi “just one more month” to wean itself off Russian oil. To cap it all, Trump unilaterally announced a ceasefire during the India-Pakistan conflict and claimed personal credit for ending it.
The muted response of the Modi government throughout surprised many and raised several eyebrows, especially from a Prime Minister who had promised muscular foreign policy.
This war on Iran can cost India dearly. New Delhi may not be directly involved, but the stakes are too immediate to be ignored. India has 9 million nationals across the Gulf countries, whose remittances home run to USD 50 billion. India imports 88 per cent of its crude oil requirement, half of which moves through the Strait of Hormuz.
The right-wing think-tanks could neither visualise such a turn of events nor suggest a policy to respond to it. Capitulation to the United States may well be their considered response, given that the US-Israel-India axis is the centrepiece of their ideology.
Surprisingly, in all these years, these think-tanks have failed to produce a coherent alternative foreign policy framework. Their energies, instead, have gone into settling scores with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, architect of Indian foreign policy. Their sole contribution to policy thinking has been coining the phrase “multi-alignment,” a clumsy attempt to disown Nehru’s non-alignment, and dressing it up as doctrine.
What is missed entirely is that you are either aligned or non-aligned. Multi-aligned simply means aligned with one or more countries, whether only the US or also Israel, which is a matter of detail, not doctrine. In the absence of a viable foreign policy framework, Modi has managed only to seize opportunities for optics: addressing diaspora events on domestic themes abroad amid chants of “Modi, Modi,” hugging world leaders to project proximity and unthinkingly toeing the US line on all vital issues, including the Quad.
The Quadrilateral of Japan, Australia, India and the United States took shape in 2007 for cooperation in the backdrop of the 2004 tsunami. In 2017, it was turned into an anti-China formation. Modi acquiesced, paying the price of alienating China — this after heavily investing in personal optics with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu.
India and Iran share centuries-old cultural and civilisational bonds. India signed a Friendship Treaty with Iran in 1950 and the relationship endured. India’s work with Iran on the Chabahar Port stands as a symbol of economic cooperation to mutual advantage.
More than anything else, the Modi government is surrendering India’s sovereign autonomy to take decisions in its own enlightened national interest. That is tantamount to a betrayal of the nation.
This post was last modified on March 13, 2026 8:10 pm