May 11 marks the 25th year of India successfully conducting underground nuclear tests in Pokhran, Rajasthan and declaring itself a Nuclear Power State, joining the ranks of nations like the US, Russia, France, Israel, UK, China with the established capability. It is celebrated annually as the National Technology Day.
Post Independence, the Pokhran-II is one of the defining moments, when India’s nuclear and defence scientists joined hands to carry out underground tests on May 11 and 13 of 1998. The tests, not only caught big powers like the US napping, but also attracted their ire and sanctions both on the economic and technology fronts for sometimes.
The ‘Operation Shakthi’, as it was codenamed was a top secret operation led jointly by Dr R Chidambaram, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and A P J Abdul Kalam, Chairman of the Defence Research and Development Organisation with Dr R Santhanam, coordinating between the two departments.
Intentions and achievements
A quick review of the developments and consequences of India’s unexpected leap into the exclusive club of nuclear weapons States shows that the nation has ample reasons to be satisfied with fulfilling many of the objectives of Pokhran II of May, 1998.
While India flexed its muscle under the Premiership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and demanded its just place among the nuclear powers of the time, the Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) led by the US came down scathing in criticism and questioned the nuclear explosions. In a swift reaction, it imposed sanctions too.
Another consequence was the immediate reaction of the hostile neighbour, Pakistan claiming to have conducted its own nuclear tests in a week and declaring itself on parity with India. It got support from China. The net result was a dangerous possibility of the beginning of a nuclear race in the sub-continent and growing threats.
However, the pro-active diplomacy crafted and pursued so well by the then External Affairs Ministry led by Jaswant Singh succeeded in converting a serious crisis into an opportunity by securing legitimacy for its nuclear arsenal and removing major obstacles in generating nuclear power.
The diplomatic efforts helped win the US confidence and led to the signing of the India-US nuclear deal in 2006 between Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh and US President George W Bush Jr. This in no uncertain terms mainstreamed India in the nuclear arena. It gave access to the global nuclear market for the development of nuclear power without signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
However, the country could not derive benefits because of the enactment of the nuclear Liability law by the Parliament, which was opposed by the US and most of the NSG countries. It impacted nuclear trade. On top of it the setback suffered by the nuclear industry following the disastrous Fukushima accident in Japan led to a slowdown in the sector and hesitation among the powers to push for the expansion. Consequently, India could not exploit the many agreements it signed to grow its domestic programme.
The nuclear power programme with an ambitious target of 20,000 MW by 2020 also suffered with limitations of funding for the Russian reactors, slowing down of interest from the US and France and issues of land acquisition to environmental issues. As a result, the country ended up with just around 6000 MW of installed capacity and a share of about 3 percent in the overall energy mix of the country.
Political consequences
In hindsight, the intentions of the Vajpayee led NDA government was two-fold–to prove that India had the technology capability and emerge as a strong nation and secondly, derive possible political benefits if any as the minority BJP led coalition desperately needed to shore up numbers to form a stable government.
The secrecy stemmed out of the last minute pull out by the previous Congress (I) government led by P V Narasimha Rao, reportedly under pressure from the US government sometime during 1995. So, the Vajpayee regime took utmost care to ensure that the entire ‘Operation Shakthi’ was under wraps and only very few were in the know.
Did it gain political mileage? Going by the results of the general elections held towards the end of 1998, the BJP made very little gain, though it again emerged as the single largest party. It helped Vajpayee become the PM for the third time on a more euphoric note of becoming a nuclear state. However, the nation had to confront the heat of the sanctions, which perhaps, in a way contributed to a bit of stability in the NDA coalition to face the tough fallout.
Pokhran -II was a vastly improved version of Pokhran -I carried out by the Indira Gandhi government in 1974. The technology sanctions of those times led to the country strengthening its own indigenous programme envisioned by Homi Bhabha and taken forward by H N Sethna and Raja Ramanna in the first couple of decades.
The dramatic announcement
It was a blistering hot, Sunday on a May afternoon of 1998 in New Delhi when the Press Information Bureau (PIB) informed the media that Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee will address the media in the late afternoon. There was no immediate provocation, it appeared. Was it the usual political issues that plagued his fragile coalition? As I covered science and politics for BusinessLine and nothing on hand, the sheer curiosity took me to the event. The rest is history as they say.
Brajesh Mishra, the all-powerful National Security Adviser and Vajpayee’s ‘man Friday’ came first and briefed the media about the strategic affairs and India’s nuclear programme on the lawns of 7, Race Course Road, the official PM residence. Then arrived the PM himself, and Vajpayee in his typical slow, pause style broke the biggest news story of the times.
It was an important development for both the country and Vajpayee, who was leading a precarious coalition under the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). If the world nations had any doubts after Pokhran-1 (Buddha Smiling project) of 1974, carried out during the time of Indira Gandhi, they were to be largely answered in 1998. Though, the lingering doubts about the thermonuclear explosion (equivalent of a hydrogen bomb) persisted for years within the scientific (atomic) community.
A week later, on May 18, the Sunday after the nuclear tests, a media conference was organised with national and international media in attendance at the Shastri Bhavan, New Delhi. It was addressed by the External Affairs spokesperson, R Chidambaram, APJ Abdul Kalam and a battery of top officials.
The representative of a top US publication shot off a question asking Kalam, who was referred to as a nuclear scientist and had emerged as the visible face of Pokhran-II among the scientists and technologists, if the nuclear adventure was justifiable, especially — a poor nation struggling to feed its millions, and lacking sanitation?
In his inimitable, storytelling style, Kalam patiently explained: “India has always been a nation under attack in its long history. It has seldom attacked another country. India is presently, surrounded by hostile neighbours, and it requires strong deterrence. In contrast, the US has never been attacked and had the least threat, but why it possesses the highest number of nuclear weapons. Was it justified?”, he asked.
In the past 25 years it is reasonable to infer that India has behaved in a highly responsible manner on its nuclear deterrence policy of ‘No first use’ and use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. It’s progress in adding nuclear power has fallen way short of targets, much to the disappointment of its proponents. The rise of renewable sources of energy, the competitive prices and clean technology can further impact nuclear energy in the future. However, the benefit of attaining nuclear deterrence and status among the big powers through Pokhran 1and II will stand India in good stead.
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