By Kalpana Kannabiran
The recent public misdemeanour by the Chief Minister of Bihar, Nitish Kumar, against a woman doctor, grabbing her hijab and pulling it off her face in full public view during an official function in the course of his official duties as Chief Minister amounts to an assault on the personal liberty, bodily integrity and dignity of a woman – and is covered by the criminal law protections against outraging modesty of women, and under the common law understanding of moral turpitude, which over decades has been held by courts of all jurisdictions to be sufficient ground for termination from office and from employment and related benefits, as the case may be.
Most importantly it violates the constitutional rights of dignity, liberty and privacy. There are reports that the lady doctor who was selected for government service in Bihar at the time of this incident, and was given her certificate by the Chief Minister who grabbed at her veil while handing the certificate, is in a state of shock and has refused to return to Bihar and join the service.
The act of the Chief Minister therefore has immediate, negative consequences for this doctor and others in a similar position – both on religious and gender lines. Can Muslim women be safe in a working environment controlled by this Chief Minister, when these are the standards he sets? Can women be safe in working environments where impunity is guaranteed to public authorities to publicly flaunt their moral turpitude?
Let us remember that the Supreme Court sent KPS Gill to prison for a similar act – although Gill was a more insignificant authority than Nitish Kumar is. By now we have had courts singing paeans to the right of women to dignity, autonomy and integrity, and yet, we have visuals of a cackling Chief Minister grabbing the veil of a woman in a public function.
Acts of Moral Turpitude and the Law An act of moral turpitude, according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary is ‘an act or behavior that gravely violates the sentiment or accepted standard of the community’ Moral Turpitude as defined in the Black’s Law Dictionary is as follows: ‘The act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in the private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.’ It implies ‘something immoral in itself regardless of it being punishable by law’.
This is a definition that has been reiterated by all courts in deciding on the termination of service and employment benefits to persons found guilty of acts of moral turpitude. Take for instance this report of a judgment from the Madras High Court in 2010: ‘Moral turpitude means anything done contrary to honesty, modesty and good morals. The expression should be understood in the light of prevailing norms that is expected from a person.
It should be interpreted in the widest possible manner while considering the conduct of a person convicted and sentenced, the Madras High Court has said citing the Supreme Court’. Section 74 of the BNS (and Section 354 IPC) defines the crime of ‘outraging the modesty of a woman’: Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will there by outrage her modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine (emphasis added).
In a recent case, the Kerala High Court held that the offence under Section 354 IPC is not a private wrong but a crime against the dignity of a woman and the collective conscience of society. Importantly, it observed that ‘compromise would…encourage impunity.’ (Shereef & Ors. Vs. State of Kerala, Criminal Revision Petition No. 1329 of 2023. Decided on 1st August 2025). The Constitutional Right to Dignity, and Personal Liberty.
A long line of cases from Rupan Deol Bajaj to Vishakha has held that outraging modesty/sexual harassment is violative of women’s dignity, right to equality and non-discrimination under the Constitution of India. Where a public authority is responsible for such misdemeanour, the immediate action must be removal from office.
Where the act is one of targeted assault – in this case, the public humiliation of a Muslim woman amounting to criminal misdemeanour – with silent and laughing bystanders, the penalty must involve suo motu prosecution by a constitutional court and the imposition of penalties including debarment from holding public office. This act by Nitish Kumar is also an assault on the freedom of religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution of India.
Indian courts have no doubt been divided on the question of the hijab – yet, we, as citizens, and the entire judiciary (irrespective of individual judges’ stands on the hijab), must ponder over whether stripping the hijab off women is permissible under any law of the land. This is an act of criminal intimidation that has far-reaching consequences. An act of this nature by the Chief Minister is a dog whistle for the mobs that are ever-in-waiting for a cue to follow the leader.
Puttaswamy vs. Union of India inscribes human dignity as the normative basis of the constitution, and weaves it in with ‘human rights’. Elaborating on the privacy-dignity dyad, the court observes, ‘Privacy of the individual is an essential aspect of dignity… Privacy of the body entitles an individual to the integrity of the physical aspects of personhood.
The intersection between one’s mental integrity and privacy entitles the individual to freedom of thought, the freedom to believe in what is right, and the freedom of self-determination… Dignity cannot exist without privacy. Both reside within the inalienable values of life, liberty and freedom which the Constitution has recognised. Privacy is the ultimate expression of the sanctity of the individual. It is a constitutional value which straddles across the spectrum of fundamental rights and protects for the individual a zone of choice and self-determination’ (para 298).
In an increasingly volatile political environment that is weighted disproportionately against the dignity of religious minorities, it is important to revisit the jurisprudence on human dignity and the fundamental right to privacy, which would specifically apply to this case. Let us not reduce the implications of this incident – it is an assault on personal liberty, and must be understood as such by all.
(The writer is a sociologist based in Hyderabad)
