Dismantling the myth of Muslim population boom in India

By Mohan Rajagopal

While at first glance, statistics are considered to be unbiased measures of truth, it remains possible to warp data narratives to suit one’s interests. The politicisation of data is especially apparent in the study of demographics in the context of religious communities.

A discourse that has gripped India over the past few decades has been the idea that the Muslim community in the nation has caused a population boom. Using surface-level data and statistics, these allegations have instigated anxieties surrounding an eventual skew, with Muslims supposedly outnumbering Hindus in the country. A nuanced analysis of the data reveals that while Muslims may have the highest fertility rate in the nation, this is fast declining. Further, high fertility is often a result of socio-economic factors that indicate the skewed living experiences of Muslims as compared to Hindus and other religious affiliations.

Recently, Organiser, a mouthpiece of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), published an opinion on why the “growing population of Muslims in India should be a matter of concern.” The rhetoric weaponised here uses two statistics to prove the alleged Muslim boom: that Muslims have the highest birth rate in India, and that the percentage of Muslims in India has risen from 9.8% in 1951 to 14.2% in 2011. Although these figures are not incorrect, a careful analysis is required to better understand the larger picture.

As per the results of the fifth edition of the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) data from 2019-21, Muslims do have the highest Total Fertility Rate (TFR) at 2.4. Hindus and Christians have a TFR of around 1.9, and Sikhs of 1.6. However, the decline in TFR is also the fastest for Muslims, marking a decrease of 47% since NFHS-1 (1992-93) compared to 41% for Hindus. Considering the higher rate of decline in TFR for Muslims, the gap in fertility between Hindus and Muslims has been decreasing over the decades and is likely to converge soon.

The NFHS study also reveals that variations in fertility rates are caused by region and geographical location. Those regions with high fertility on average were characterised by higher rates across all groups, irrespective of religious affiliation, and the same holds for low-fertility regions. In The Population Myth, former Chief Election Commissioner S.Y. Quraishi discusses the inter-state differences in fertility.

Using NFHS-4 (2015-16) data, it is seen that Kerala has the lowest and Bihar has the highest TFR in the nation. The fertility rate for Muslims in Kerala (1.86) is far below that of Hindus in Bihar (3.29), implying that religion is not the most powerful driver of fertility. Instead, it can be inferred that if populations of some religions are concentrated in a high-fertility state, they are likely to have high fertility on account of the region, as opposed to the religion. Quraishi suggests that “there is no ‘Hindu fertility’, ‘Muslim fertility’, or ‘Christian fertility’ as such.”

The Hindu nationalist arguments surrounding Muslim fertility falsely claim that correlation implies causation: since it is Muslims who have the highest fertility rate, it is assumed that fertility is higher by virtue of being Muslim. However, religion is only one of the pieces of the complicated picture that makes up fertility studies.

Poverty and education are some major determinants of fertility rates, both of which differ between Hindus and Muslims and could account for the differences in TFR across the communities. Other factors like access to healthcare, age of the population, and historical and cultural norms impact fertility, which cannot be accurately captured in a political dialogue of the population.

Reuters attempted a qualitative study of the response to family planning measures by the Muslim community in India, in 2021. Organiser and other proponents of the Muslim boom rhetoric have blamed the supposed refusal of birth control and other initiatives by Muslims for their higher fertility rate. On the contrary, the report finds that priorities in Muslim families have begun shifting towards better education and quality of life for their children, as opposed to having larger families. In a conversation with Reuters, a Muslim priest, or imam, addresses the misconception that Islam does not support birth control measures: “The Shariat (Islamic law) talks of family planning. It is our responsibility to clear these misconceptions.”

Disproportionate fertility rates can also be the consequence of the inability of public health care services to keep up with the demand for birth control and other family planning measures. Based on NFHS-4 data, 16.4% of Muslim couples aged 15-49 years have an unmet need for contraception. Meanwhile, only 12.4% of Hindu couples have an unmet need for the same, pointing to unequal access to healthcare and contraceptive services.

Generalising superficial statistics to feed political rhetoric sets a dangerous precedent for how data and figures are consumed by the layperson. With a lowering fertility rate and increased receptiveness to family planning, Muslims are unlikely to “overtake” the Hindu population at any point, and the myth of the Muslim population boom remains just that: a myth.

Mohan Rajagopal is a Research Intern with the Centre for Development Policy and Practice, Hyderabad.

Sources:

1. Choudhury, S.U.S. (2023, February 14). Why growing population of Muslims in India should be a matter of concern? Organiser. https://organiser.org/2023/02/14/108035/opinion/why-growing-population-of-muslims-in-india-should-be-a-matter-of-concern/.
2. (2011). Census of India. Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/lcwaN0017959/.
3. (2021). National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5), India, 2019-21. International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and ICF. https://main.mohfw.gov.in/sites/default/files/NFHS-5_Phase-II_0.pdf.
4.  (2017). National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5), India, 2015-16. International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and ICF. http://rchiips.org/nfhs/NFHS-4Reports/India.pdf.
5.  Quraishi, S.Y. (2021). Population growth and family planning. The population myth: Islam, family planning and politics in India (pp. 25-67). Harper Collins.
6. Rajesh, Y.P., & Kataria, S. (2023, April 12). India’s birth control measures resonate among its Muslims, priests play a role. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-birth-control-measures-resonate-among-its-muslims-priests-play-role-2023-04-12/#:~:text=Government%20data%20from%202019%2D21,the%20Hindu%20rate%20of%201.94.
7. Quraishi, S.Y. (2021). Population growth and family planning. The population myth: Islam, family planning and politics in India (pp. 25-67). Harper Collins.