When Dosabhoy Framji Karaka, the Bombay-based veteran war correspondent of British India, wrote about the finer military details of Operation Polo, not only was he implying that the brief war was named after the popular game of the Indian Army but he also tries to explain why the Government of India had to use the services of one Lieutenant General, three Major Generals and a whole Armoured Division to implement the military intervention that was termed as ‘a glorious victory for internal security’ at home and as ‘Police Action’ abroad.
In 1948, Lieutenant General Sir E.N. Goddard, who was the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Southern Command was informed through a directive to prepare a plan for Hyderabad’s occupation. He was given a choice of selecting HQ1 Armoured Division or HQ5 Infantry Division. The General selected the former and was allotted one Armoured Brigade which included the Poona Horse, the 3rd Cavalry and the 9th Battalion of the 17th Dogra Regiment; the 7th Infantry Brigade, consisting of three Infantry Battalions; the 9th Infantry Brigade, also consisting of three Infantry Battalions; three independent Infantry Battalions; three regiments of Field Artillery, including one anti-tank Regiment. In addition, there was one troop of the 18th Cavalry and the usual paraphernalia of service corps and maintenance troops.
The Southern Command had completed its strategy by the middle of March 1948, and sent it to the Indian government for approval. A two-sided attack on Hyderabad was planned at this point, with the main force moving down the main Sholapur route, about 186 miles from the target, and a lesser force pushing on to the Bezwada road, about 160 miles away from Hyderabad.
The HQ1 Armoured Division and one Armoured Brigade were hastily transferred to Southern Command by the middle of April 1948. Brigadier General S.D. Verma was appointed Commander of the Armoured Brigade shortly after Major General J.N. Chaudhuri was given command of the Division. In April, Ranchi’s 9th Infantry Brigade was also transferred to Bangalore.
While the Indian army were preparing to surround Hyderabad, Lord Mountbatten was seen promising the Nizam: On 8th April, Mountbatten said, “I can now once more assure you that to the best of my knowledge and belief, Pandit Nehru and other Ministers of the Central Government of India have in no way been parties to any policy of applying economic pressure on Hyderabad. I do not know if you have ever met Pandit Nehru; if you had, I do not believe that you would allow any accusation of the nature you imply to be levelled against him.”
Lord Mountbatten was correct; Pandit Nehru did not consider using economic pressure because he was too preoccupied contemplating the use of military pressure. Given that there was no danger involved with the drill, it seemed that the new Indian administration was a little eager to put on a show of power for the benefit of the country’s newly freed citizens.
The planning and training for Operation Polo was completed from May to September 1948. The Southern Command evaluated the capability of the Hyderabadi army. There were 22,000 soldiers in the regular army under General El Edroos, and they were armed with eight 25-pounder guns and three regiments of armoured vehicles. The irregular forces totalled about ten thousand. In addition, there were ten thousand Paigahs and Arabs who were armed with rifles and sten guns, as well as ten thousand police and customs officers. Then there were unnumbered Razakars with arms of all kinds. The Indian Army failed to take into account a sizable number of polo sticks that was easily available in Hyderabad. The Southern Command was informed of General El Edroos’ status as an ace general as highly classified intelligence.
A final attempt was made by Lord Mountbatten to convince Pandit Nehru to oppose the takeover of Hyderabad. But Sardar Patel reminded Nehru that they had promised not to interfere in one other’s affairs.
A Strike Force, a Smash Force, a Kill Force, a Vir Force and a Rear Division Force were to enter Hyderabad. Major skirmishes occurred at Sholapur, Bezwada, and Naldurg. The brief conflict, in which Hyderabad suffered significantly more losses than the Indian army, was over in just five days. General Maharaj Shri Rajendrasinhji, who took over as GOC of Southern Command after General Goddard, demanded El Edroos to surrender his weapons. Hyderabad radio at 5 PM broadcasted the State Army’s surrender.
The official surrender on the next day was originally to have the Prince of Berar, Azam Jah, and India’s Agent General in Hyderabad, K. M. Munshi, but the plans changed to have only General El Edroos surrender his army when Major General J. N. Chaudhuri arrived in his jeep and walked towards the Hyderabad Army general. The surrender was to be unconditional and the Hyderabad Army had come under the command of Chaudhuri by virtue of the powers vested in the latter by General Maharaj Shri Rajendrasinhji, GOC Southern Command.
Then, Chaudhuri offered Edroos a cigarette and lit it with a Ronson lighter. The game of polo ended. There were congratulatory messages sent from all over to the victorious Indian Army.
In Hyderabad, a military governor who was supported by a declaration of military government was appointed. The cabinet of the Nizam was dismissed. The Razakar leader Kasim Rizvi and Hyderabad’s Prime Minister Mir Laik Ali were detained. Since Independence, a document made by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting’s Publication Division records: “in five days Hyderabad was freed from the clutches of the Razakars and the Nizam was restored to liberty of action. He decided to accede to India.” Thus, the military intervention known as Police Action ended the polo match.
In the Report of the Financial Adviser to the H.E.H, the Nizam of Hyderabad, the proclamation of a military government did not give the impression of liberation. The Nizam was then requested to take on the role of Rajpramukh or constitutional head of Hyderabad, an honour he had no option but to accept. The Indian government knew that the Nizam was the best candidate to rule Hyderabad because any other candidate would face opposition from the populace. Thus, a letter was written on 1st February 1949 by J.N. Chaudhuri to the Nizam to establish this new relationship that was later formalized as an official agreement between the Indian Union and the State of Hyderabad on one hand and the Nizam of Hyderabad on the other.
Prof Salma Ahmed Farooqui is the Director of H.K. Sherwani Centre for Deccan Studies, Maulana Azad National Urdu University, Hyderabad
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