indian courts

In a constitutional democracy, criticism of institutions, particularly the judiciary, must be articulated with restraint, precision and fidelity to constitutional principle. Yet, restraint does not entail silence. Certain developments, when viewed cumulatively rather than episodically, compel careful articulation, not polemically, but as principled concern. What follows is not an indictment of the institution of the judiciary, but an examination of systemic tendencies that raise troubling questions about judicial role, institutional consistency and the lived reality of constitutional guarantees. A recent episode involving judicial disapproval of media reporting on remarks made on social media illustrates a growing unease. Courts expressed displeasure not merely with the content reported itself but with the act of reporting the comments of the Bench by the media, the displeasure being accompanied by suggestions that judicial interaction on the Bench might cease if such reportage continued. Interaction is a necessity when clarifications are required, so the response invites scrutiny. Judges are constitutionally tasked with adjudication, listening to both parties, framing issues, asking legally relevant questions and rendering reasoned decisions. Increasingly, however, in some cases, judicial comment from the bench takes on a pontificating tone, expressing what could have been done differently, could have been avoided or how people ought to have behaved. Such observations, while rhetorically forceful, fall outside the adjudicatory brief and risk confusing judicial authority with moral commentary. The contrast in societal and institutional responses to religious expression further underscores selective sensitivities. A widely reported incident involving a school in London requesting Hindu students to remove tilak marks, leading parents to withdraw their children, was met with vocal condemnation. Yet, closer home, the exclusion of Muslim girls wearing the hijab from educational institutions, accompanied in some instances by physical acts of vigilantism, elicited neither comparable societal outrage nor institutional redress. Instead, the restrictions were ultimately upheld by courts of law. The divergence suggests that geography, identity and majoritarian context significantly influenced perceptions of rights and violations. Societal responses to the two situations were opposed. Constitutional equality, however, admits no such relativism. Also ReadInterview: Justice Muralidhar on 'weak' CJIs, Ayodhya verdict and more Delay in justice transforms its meaning The issue of delay in justice delivery is neither novel nor abstract. Consider the case of Nambiar, an octogenarian, falsely implicated in a grave offence, where accountability proceedings against errant officials are to commence more than a decade later. When will they end? Or consider the acquittal of Sajjan Kumar, decades after the alleged offence, in a case arising from mass violence in 1984. Such timelines are not mere administrative failures, they communicate powerful messages. To law enforcement, they signal impunity. To society, they suggest that legality is negotiable and that consequences, if any, are distant and diluted. Delay, in such contexts, does not merely postpone justice: it altogether transforms its meaning. These realities sit uneasily alongside judicial pronouncements that “justice delayed is justice destroyed,” a formulation recently reiterated by the Chief Justice of India Surya Kant. The aphorism is unexceptionable; its implications are not. What duration of pre-trial incarceration constitutes destruction of justice? Five years without bail? How should one characterise habeas corpus petitions pending for years? If delay annihilates justice, institutional silence or inertia in the face of such delay demands explanation. Whether the cause of the non-addressing of reasons for delay is solution unawareness, inability or obstruction, the constitutional consequence remains the same. Judicial independence itself has been publicly interrogated from within the institution. Justice Bhuyan’s remarks questioning whether collegium recommendations altered at executive request compromise institutional integrity strike at the heart of the separation of powers. The concern is crucial. Independence is not just an absence of overt interference, but preservation of decisional autonomy and public confidence in that pro-active autonomy. Similarly, illustrative is the acquittal of Medha Patkar by the Delhi High Court nearly two decades after initiation of defamation proceedings. The acquittal restores legal innocence, but the timeline of the process itself raises a sobering question: had more coercive statutes been invoked, prolonged incarceration might have preceded her eventual vindication. Process in such cases becomes punishment. Innocents suffer and are embittered. International developments add another layer of concern. Requests by foreign authorities to bypass Indian governmental channels for service of summons, premised on alleged non-cooperation, may or may not succeed legally. Adverse reputational impact, however, is undeniable. They reinforce existing international hesitations regarding extradition and cooperation, often justified by reference to prison conditions and procedural delays. Aspirations of global moral leadership cannot coexist comfortably with such perceptions. Also ReadThe legal blindfold in denying Umar Khalid, Sharjeel Imam bail Contempt laws, academic freedom The law of contempt further illustrates asymmetry. While doctrine permits criticism of judgments but not judges, the line is often policed unevenly. Human fallibility, including fragile egos, is not unknown in any profession. Yet judicial authority demands an “adult” institutional posture, capable of withstanding critique without resorting to coercive silencing. A judiciary that invites reverence must also tolerate scrutiny. Academic freedom presents a parallel concern. When eminent historians such as Romila Thapar describe the excision of entire historical periods from curricula as intellectually indefensible, the issue of truth transcends politics. History cannot be taught in fragments without distorting collective memory. A nation insecure about its past cannot credibly claim mastery over its future. Political theory has long warned of democratic erosion through short-term populism. Alexis de Tocqueville famously cautioned that democracies undermine themselves if voters prioritise immediate material gain, especially at election time, over structural wellbeing. When electoral choice is reduced to transactional benefit rather than constitutional vision, future generations’ futures are mortgaged. A polity thus educated, through sanitised history and instrumental politics, cannot plausibly aspire to civilisational leadership. Political theory has long warned of democratic erosion through short-term populism. Alexis de Tocqueville famously cautioned that democracies undermine themselves if voters prioritise immediate material gain, especially at election time, over structural well-being. When electoral choice is reduced to transactional benefit rather than constitutional vision, future generations’ futures are mortgaged. A polity thus educated, through sanitised history and instrumental politics, cannot plausibly aspire to civilisational leadership. For practitioners of law like me, this inconsistency has practical consequences. Legal advice depends on predictability, not of outcomes but of principle. When judicial responses appear contingent on the identity of the accused or the seriousness and gravity of the allegation rather than settled constitutional doctrine, the rule of law itself becomes contingent. This perception may be inaccurate. If so, clarity is urgently required. If accurate, correction is imperative. A university, it is often said, cannot be closed because it exists not in buildings but in minds. The same is true of a nation. Its constitutional vitality depends not on slogans or ceremonies, but on the integrity of its institutions, the courage of its judiciary, and the honesty of its historical self-understanding. Without these, aspirations of greatness remain rhetorical, not real. Claiming the status of Vishwa Guru, we must deliver: evolve into and become one. Jai Hind.

indian courts

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